The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released most of its investigation of what happened on Oct. 7, 2023, and in the days leading up to Hamas’ massacre. While the initial investigation began in November 2023, outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi ordered all units to start probes in March 2024. The IDF refrained from offering recommendations in its report, saying that those would be left to incoming IDF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir, who will enter the role next week.

 Israeli forces are seen among the rubble of buildings destroyed after the clashes between Israeli and Palestinian forces in Be’eri, Israel on Oct. 13, 2023.  (Nir Keidar/Anadolu via Getty Images)

6. “Early signs” missed 

In the evening hours of Oct. 6, 2023, Israeli sim cards were activated inside Gaza. However, this was not alerted as it had happened before. Those same sim cards would later allow Hamas militants to communicate after they crossed the border into Israel. There were also indications that night that Hamas leaders were meeting. However, according to the IDF’s assessment, neither of these facts were enough to change the Intelligence Directorate’s way of thinking on Gaza, therefore there was no alert.
There were also indications of both usual and unusual Hamas activity that evening. The inquiry revealed that there were intelligence sources that could have been utilized overnight to enhance information that were not used. However, the IDF asserts that had the Intelligence Directive changed its assessment of the situation, there would have been a higher alert for a localized Hamas offensive, but not for an all-out war.

7. Assessment of the IAF

The IAF was found to have met and even exceeded the defined standards for readiness except for two instances due to heavy rocket fire. However, these standards did not align with what would have been required to prepare for a large-scale surprise attack. The IDF concluded that there was “significant difficulty” distinguishing IDF troops, civilians and terrorists from one another.

While the IAF struck key Hamas command centers, the IDF admits that even in its review of the strikes it is challenging to determine if there could have been a more effective strike effort given the circumstances.

However, it was noted that the IDF did not prepare for anything like the brutal Oct. 7 massacre.
“We were addicted to the precise intelligence and information we got as commanders and did not consider other scenarios. This failure will forever be etched in our memories, and we will never and should never forget,” IDF senior officials wrote.

A destroyed house after a battle between Israeli soldiers and Palestinan terrorists on Oct. 10, 2023 in Kfar Aza, Israel. (Amir Levy/Getty Images)

In its conclusion, the IDF notes that the assessment of the situation in Gaza and regarding Hamas was so entrenched in the establishment that there was no deep discussion about alternate possibilities. Additionally, it now says that it was “incorrect” to try to “conflict manage” Hamas and, in the future, the removal of threats should be prioritized.

The assessment also addresses the possibility of a future attack, saying that a preventative strategy will be key.