A DAMNING report into the doomed Titan sub has laid a bare catalogue of fatal failures and negligence that led to the deaths of five people.

The bombshell file also points squarely at OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush as the man to blame for the 2023 disaster.

The 335-page investigation, released Tuesday by the US Coast Guard, concludes the tragedy was “preventable” and driven by “critically flawed” practices, design shortcuts, and an appalling safety culture inside the deep-sea tourism company.

Rush, who died in the implosion along with four passengers near the wreck of the Titanic, was found to have “exhibited negligence that contributed to the deaths of four individuals”, according to the report.

In a stinging assessment, investigators said had Rush survived, they would have recommended the Department of Justice consider a criminal probe.

The report stated: “For several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company’s favourable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny.

“By strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion… OceanGate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols.”

The Titan, owned and operated by OceanGate Expeditions, imploded on June 18, 2023, while descending toward the Titanic site.

All five onboard – including British billionaire Hamish Harding, Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood and his teenage son Suleman, French Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet, and Rush himself — were killed instantly under the crushing pressure of the deep.

The report identifies eight primary causal factors behind the implosion, with the Coast Guard concluding that OceanGate’s failure to follow basic engineering protocols – including proper design, certification, testing, and maintenance – was the root cause.

Investigators were blunt: “The lack of both third-party oversight and experienced OceanGate employees on staff during their 2023 Titan operations allowed OceanGate’s chief executive officer to completely ignore vital inspections, data analyses, and preventative maintenance procedures, culminating in a catastrophic event.”

Toxic culture & intimidation tactics

The Titan’s carbon fibre design – already a source of concern within the industry – was described as “flawed”.

Prior signs of structural issues were ignored, and the company fired or threatened employees who raised alarms.

The internal culture was so toxic, the report said, that safety complaints were suppressed under the threat of termination.

The US Coast Guard noted that OceanGate employees were “asked to temporarily forgo salaries with the promise of back pay” as the company faced mounting financial stress in 2023 — pressure that led to shortcuts with deadly consequences.

One former employee told investigators: “The company was economically very stressed and as a result, [they] were making decisions that compromised safety.”

And despite a whistleblower raising safety concerns as early as 2018, OceanGate failed to launch an internal investigation.

According to the report, if that complaint had been acted on, “early intervention could have resulted in OceanGate either aligning with regulatory requirements or abandoning its plans for Titanic expeditions altogether — therefore avoiding the implosion.”

CEO to blame

Rush himself is singled out for misrepresenting the Titan’s safety, reportedly describing the sub as “indestructible” – a claim the report says gave passengers a false sense of security.

In his dual role as CEO and pilot, Rush’s unchecked authority and lack of accountability created a perfect storm of risk.

The Coast Guard concluded that the “glaring disparities between [OceanGate’s] written safety protocols and their actual practices” exemplified a company willing to sidestep regulation and reason for the sake of spectacle.

Jason Neubauer, chairman of the Marine Board of Investigation, said the findings should serve as a watershed moment for the growing but loosely regulated private deep-sea exploration industry.

He said: “There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework.”