China’s recent and massive military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II highlighted concerns around that nation’s “unprecedented military buildup.” 

And yes, China is indeed building up its military equipment at a faster pace than the U.S. But there’s a twist.

China may have a lot of hardware, but the U.S. military enjoys three key asymmetric advantages over China that bode well for our chances in any conflict — the joint-mindedness of our forces, the unity of our command and our empowered non-commissioned officer corps.

Joint warfighting is hard. The U.S. learned hard lessons during Vietnam and subsequent operations, such the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, on how interservice rivalry can lead to defeat. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was designed to create a truly joint fighting force. 

The U.S. Armed Forces are now obsessively joint-minded. The U.S. has a functioning joint staff, led by the chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The principal U.S. warfighting commands in each theater are inherently joint. 

Joint exercises are routine. For those progressing through their military careers, joint professional military education is mandatory. There is no force that does joint warfare better than the U.S. 

In contrast, as a January RAND report noted, Chinese sources admit they are way behind on joint integration, struggle to train joint warfighters and “lack competent joint commanders.”

Ironically, armed services in communist political systems are not characterized by their ability to work together toward a common objective. Rather, they exist in power-based systems where the Communist Party and its survival are supreme. 

Everybody in the system is fighting to remain in the good graces of power and avoid the next purge. 

M.I.T professor and China researcher M. Taylor Fravel has written that purges among China’s high command are creating an “insecurity dilemma” that will degrade unity of command and joint operations. 

To be sure, joint force commanders have been relieved of command in the U.S. However, the joint systems and processes are so well indoctrinated in the U.S. that the joint war machine drives on. Once a new commander is in place, unity of command is unquestioned.

The purge factor that paralyzes the top ranks of militaries in authoritarian systems trickles down to all the forces below. It is risky to show initiative or make decisions, whether you are a general or a private. 

Training for war is very different from fighting one. It’s a common military maxim that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. 

When things do not go according to plan, militaries require empowered non-commissioned officers at the point of attack to make decisions and maintain tempo and the initiative.

The U.S. military’s non-commissioned officer corps may be its most lopsided advantage over China’s People’s Liberation Army. I tell anyone who will listen that non-commissioned officers form the backbone of the U.S. military, and that’s not hyperbole. 

As a former enlisted troop myself, I have seen sergeants and corporals lead on the battlefield time and again. Even in times when they questioned their own empowerment, they were biased toward taking action.

In contrast, China’s non-commissioned officer corps has been called the “weak backbone” of China’s fighting forces. This is not because the individual soldiers are incompetent, but because authoritarian regimes are not comfortable with the concepts of empowerment or initiative. 

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, I was a defense legislative fellow advising a member of Congress on the House Armed Services Committee. 

He asked me, “Why do you think Russia was unsuccessful in getting to Kyiv when we were briefed Kyiv would fall in a matter of days?” In response, I said three things. 

First, we tend to assess military strength in terms of the quantity of hardware rather than on the people and processes required to wield it effectively. 

Second, joint warfare is hard — Russia attempted an American-style, joint multi-access, shock-and-awe invasion and it failed. 

Finally, authoritarian regimes bristle at the idea of empowering their non-commissioned officers.

I stand by my assessment, and I believe a similar situation exists with China. To be sure, I am not suggesting that a conflict with China would be easy. But I am not convinced that China can effectively wield the hardware it is developing so rapidly.

The first two Special Operations Forces truths are: “Humans are more important than hardware” and “Quality is better than quantity.” I believe these aphorisms both apply here. 

China has a lot of hardware, no doubt. What they lack, however, are the empowered people and joint processes required to wield if effectively.

Lt. Col. Brandon Temple, Ph.D., is an Air Force special warfare officer currently serving in Air Force Futures. He was previously a defense legislative fellow serving as national security adviser to a member of Congress.