Judge Stands Firm: Trump-Appointed Magistrate Blocks Indefinite ICE Detentions

An Indiana federal judge recently dismissed the significance of an appeals court decision that endorsed the Trump administration’s controversial approach to indefinitely detaining immigrants residing in the U.S.

In a nine-page ruling, U.S. District Judge Damon R. Leichty—appointed by President Trump during his initial term—ruled in favor of an immigrant in detention, granting him conditional release from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody.

“The issue at hand is whether there is anything distinct in this case that would justify a different outcome,” Judge Leichty stated. “The court sees no such justification.”

This case reflects a growing trend where detained immigrants have successfully secured writs of habeas corpus, challenging the federal government’s evolving interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

In July 2025, ICE introduced a policy mandating agents to refuse bond to individuals entering the U.S. without “inspection,” a directive that has since sparked a wave of legal challenges.

Under the terms of the policy, such immigrants are to be detained “for the duration of their removal proceedings” unless granted parole — a rarer form of release. In real terms, however, the Trump administration had made clear such detentions are intended to be indefinite.

Over the past eight months, in hundreds of district court disputes, judges have considered the interplay and applicability of two distinct INA statutes which outline the government’s detention authority. Many judges have rephrased those statutes using language from a 2018 U.S. Supreme Court ruling penned by Justice Samuel Alito.

In short, the government claims ICE has the authority to subject immigrants to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b), which applies to “aliens seeking entry into the United States.”

Oppositely, advocates for immigrants — as well as most judges who have ruled on the matter — have instead turned to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a), which applies to “aliens already present in the United States.”

In the latest ruling, petitioner Carlos Chillogalli Puzhi “must be classified” under §1226(a), Leichty determined. That classification, the judge found, entitled him to conditional release.

Unless Chillogalli Puzhi quickly receives a “custody redetermination before an immigration judge” with all the relevant procedural protections, he will be released from ICE’s custody by Feb. 17.

The judge notes the bare bones basics of the case’s trajectory for the Ecuadorian citizen originally detained upon his arrival in 2021 — noting that those basic facts informed the court’s ruling, likening the litigation to two recent cases Leichty also decided under §1226(a).

“Indeed, it strikes as curious that when the government initially encountered Mr. Chillogalli Puzhi at the border in 2021, he was released on bond and lived in the United States with the government’s permission until his re-arrest in 2025,” the opinion goes on. “Though he may be an ‘applicant for admission’ within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2), he cannot be said to be ‘seeking admission’ for the same reasons the court articulated [in those two prior cases].”

So, in one way, the court sees the Chillogalli Puzhi case as just more of the same — another immigrant improperly detained under the wrong statute. But, in very important ways, the case is a bit different.

Late last week, a divided panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit determined “the government’s position is correct” when it comes to deciding which INA statute ICE can use — vindicating the Trump administration’s plans for indefinite detention under §1225(b).

Leichty directly, but briefly, addresses that ruling, which only applies within the geographic confines of the 5th Circuit for now.

“The court has read the 2-1 decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, but remains unpersuaded,” the judge opined.

Leichty goes on to note the “default rule” for immigrants “already present in the United States” is §1226(a), which requires a bond hearing. Here, however, such a hearing was intentionally denied.

The court explains, at length:

Mr. Chillogalli Puzhi was re-arrested in October 2025 when he appeared for an ICE check-in pursuant to his release conditions and was removed to Ecuador while his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was still pending. After his counsel raised the issue of the pending appeal, he was subsequently brought back to the country by ICE on December 2, 2025, through a parole entry. He was transferred to Miami Correctional Facility (MCF), where he remains. His motion for an individualized bond hearing was denied by an immigration judge for lack of jurisdiction, because the government categorized him as ineligible for bond under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2)[.]

“Though these decisions involved some jurisdictional ping-pong as he moved locations or otherwise filed his requests in different locations, it seems that at least once, if indeed not twice, he was denied an individualized custody redetermination, either on the papers or via a bond hearing, because he was statutorily ineligible for bond under §1225(b)(2),” the court goes on. “The judges were following [Board of Immigration Appeals] guidance, but erroneous guidance as it turns out.”

Leichty stopped short of “outright release” in the case, saying it would not be a “reasonable remedy” based on the case record.

Notably, while district judges have almost entirely preferred §1226(a) in similar habeas cases, they have often split on whether a bond hearing or immediate release is best in terms of relief. Here, Leichty has opted for the former; in another like case he opted for the latter.

“Instead, the court expects the government to follow its procedures laid out in the law appreciating that Mr. Chillogalli Puzhi has been detained pursuant to a warrant issued by an immigration official under §1226,” the opinion continues. “The government must provide Mr. Chillogalli Puzhi a custody redetermination through the process afforded to him for this.”