Trump has consistently indicated that US military actions against suspected drug-trafficking vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific, which have resulted in over 80 fatalities, might escalate into ground operations in South America. Despite this, he has also reportedly engaged in dialogue with Maduro about a potential visit by the Venezuelan leader to the United States.

In recent years, Venezuelan military personnel have primarily been tasked with dealing with civilian street protests, often involving unarmed demonstrators.

While Maduro claims that 8 million civilians are training as part of militias, a source suggests that only a few thousand, including intelligence officers, armed supporters of the ruling party, and militia members, are likely to engage in actual defense efforts.

The Venezuelan military’s arsenal, largely comprising aging Russian equipment, is underwhelming. Although Caracas acquired around 20 Sukhoi fighter jets in the early 2000s, they are no match for US B-2 bombers. Additionally, Venezuela’s Russian-made helicopters, tanks, and shoulder-fired missiles are considered outdated.

The military’s equipment — much of it Russian-made and decades-old — is lacking. Caracas bought some 20 Sukhoi fighter jets in the 2000s, but they are considered lacking in comparison to US B-2s, and Venezuela’s Russian-made helicopters, tanks and shoulder-fired missiles are also outdated.

How could Venezuela respond to an attack?

The second strategy, called “anarchisation” and which officials have not acknowledged, would use intelligence services and armed ruling-party supporters to create disorder in the capital Caracas and make Venezuela ungovernable, sources say.

Are there other armed actors in Venezuela?