Now available on Netflix, “A House of Dynamite” offers a gripping experience for fans of nuclear thrillers. Beyond its entertainment value, the film serves as a crucial watch for a country investing heavily in a missile defense shield projected to potentially cost trillions of dollars, with no guarantee of success against nuclear threats. The United States has already poured over $400 billion into ballistic missile defenses that have yet to prove effective. The film urges viewers to contemplate the grim scenario of missile defense failure during a nuclear strike, depicting this as a very real possibility.

Praised by arms control experts, the film is recognized for its timely exploration of nuclear weapon risks, the pressing need for disarmament, and the illusion that missile defense can truly shield us. In contrast, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency contends that the movie underscores the potential failure of deterrence, thereby justifying the necessity for an active missile defense system at home. This divergence of perspectives raises the question: which viewpoint holds more weight?

In a striking scene, the fictional deputy national security advisor explains to a fictional secretary of Defense, “We are talking about hitting a bullet with a bullet,” when asked about the odds of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system intercepting a nuclear missile. The advisor adds, “Our mid-course intercept system has a 61 percent success rate.”

While the bullet analogy is apt, the real challenge is more akin to intercepting a barrage of bullets with another barrage. A genuine nuclear assault on the U.S. would likely involve multiple missiles, aiming to overwhelm defenses and reduce retaliation capabilities. Additionally, these missiles might be equipped with decoys to mislead missile defense radars, increasing the likelihood of a warhead reaching its target. Even a single missile breaching defenses could result in catastrophic consequences.

The film’s reference to a “60 percent” success rate likely mirrors the real-world performance of the ground-based defense system. Out of 21 tests, the Pentagon claims 12 were successful. Nonetheless, this figure can mislead observers into overestimating the system’s reliability.

According to a 2025 report by the American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs, ground-based system tests “have been conducted under scripted conditions and designed for success: the Pentagon has consistently rated the … tests as low in operational realism.” In these tests, the timing of the launch is generally known in advance, and chosen to align with the sun hitting the targets, making them easier to see. And each of the tests only attempted to defeat one missile, rather than a salvo.

Although the proposed Golden Dome missile defense shield is expected to pursue a layered defense, with space-based interceptors as well as ground-based interceptors playing a role, the reality is that no missile defense system can guarantee a 100 percent success rate against nuclear weapons. There are simply too many ways of getting around them. Decoys, which are not difficult to develop, would require a missile defense system capable of differentiating between all the decoys and any debris accompanying each nuclear warhead.

A single missile can also carry multiple warheads. These would all need to be intercepted once they separate from their missile. A nuclear detonation in space, a possible result of a successful interception or a deliberate attack on space-based missile defense systems, could also disrupt the ability of missile defense radars to locate and differentiate between additional targets.

Between 1957 and 2021, the U.S. spent over $400 billion in a vain effort to defend the nation against ballistic missile threats. No system to date has demonstrated anything close to an ability to do so. According to the American Enterprise Institute, a robust architecture for just one element of the planned Golden Dome — space-based interceptors designed to take out nuclear missiles in their boost phase (before they first leave the atmosphere) — could cost $6 trillion over 20 years. And even then, there would be no guarantee that such a system could achieve a 100 percent success rate.

Moreover, the very act of pursuing such a missile defense system is already encouraging U.S. adversaries to expand their nuclear arsenals and develop additional technologies to circumvent missile defenses. So, counterintuitively, missile defense is making the world less safe.

“A House of Dynamite” leaves its audience with a well-placed sense of dread over the dangers of nuclear weapons. But sinking trillions of dollars into missile defense systems that can be easily defeated is a counterproductive response to that dread. Instead, the U.S. can reduce the nuclear threat by pursuing negotiations to limit and reduce the world’s nuclear arsenals and the unacceptable threat they pose to humankind.

The New START Treaty, which limits the number of intercontinental nuclear weapons the U.S. and Russia can deploy, is set to expire in February. Renewing it would be a good place to start. Thankfully for a nation that just surpassed $38 trillion in debt, nuclear diplomacy is also far more affordable.

Gabe Murphy is a policy analyst at Taxpayers for Common Sense, a national nonpartisan budget watchdog advocating for transparency and calling out wasteful spending.