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You could practically hear the cheering on Thursday as critics of President Trump finally got what they’ve waited months for — some indication that tariffs might (finally!) drive prices higher.
Yesterday’s Producer Price Index report showed wholesale prices jumped 0.9 percent over the last month, the biggest gain since June 2022. It followed another benign Consumer Price Index report published earlier in the week, making it all the more surprising. But, more than three-quarters of the gain was driven by services price escalation; there was some rise in the cost of machinery and other end goods, but the impact from tariffs was inconclusive.
Here’s a fact: No one — not Fed Chairman Jay Powell, not Goldman Sachs’ CEO David Solomon, not Paul Krugman, who predicted markets would collapse if Trump were elected in 2016, nor all the talking heads on Bloomberg and elsewhere who have blasted Trump’s tariff regimen — has any idea how his upending of global trade terms will turn out.
There has never been a country that dominated the global economy as the U.S. now does, nor has there ever been a president like Trump determined to take advantage of that clout. Many have compared his tariffs with the stiff duties imposed by the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, but there are huge differences between then and now, which may account for some of the unrelenting negativity about the president’s program.
Today, unlike then, the U.S. is the essential nation for producers of consumer goods. Americans spent $20 trillion last year, compared to $10 trillion by residents of the European Union and $8 trillion by Chinese citizens. Though the U.S. accounted for a larger share of global GDP in 1930 than it does today (35 percent vs. 26 percent), we were not the primary buyer of other countries’ goods. In fact, in 1930, the U.S. enjoyed a trade surplus; last year, the U.S. had a net goods trade deficit of $1.2 trillion and an overall (including services) trade deficit of $918 billion — a record.
Consequently, we have not seen countries retaliate against the tariffs imposed by the president as they did in the 1930s. The Smoot-Hawley tariffs averaged 59.1 percent on some 20,000 different categories of goods. In response, as the Foundation for Economic Education recalls, “An outraged Canada slammed tariffs on goods that accounted for 30 per cent of American exports. France, Germany and the British Empire followed suit, either turning to alternative markets or developing substitute manufacturing that would replace goods previously acquired from America — or elsewhere, since many other countries were erecting wall-of-death tariffs.”
This time, at least so far, there has been remarkably little of that retaliatory tit-for-tat.
Some countries best positioned to punch back, like Canada, whose economy is inextricably integrated with that of its southern neighbor, have backed off threats to do so. Three-quarters of Canada’s exports are to the U.S., and exports account for a hefty 34 percent of the country’s GDP. A recent threat to slap U.S. tech companies with a heavy new tax vanished as Canadian officials tread carefully, hoping to eliminate the 35 percent tariff on Canadian imports not covered by the USMCA trade agreement, as well as a 50 percent tax on aluminum and steel imported from Canada.
Otherwise, China is the most obvious hold-out to Trump’s tariff regimen. Because of its grip on rare earths that are essential to U.S. manufacturers, and because it supplies a huge amount of cheap goods to American consumers, Beijing has serious leverage over the United States. Like Trump, they are willing to use it. Still, China’s economy is struggling and President Xi Jinping must know that playing hardball with Trump will eventually be a losing game.
“Between 1929 and 1933,” the Foundation for Economic Education continues, “U.S. imports collapsed by 66 per cent. Exports plummeted by 61 per cent. Total global trade fell by a similar amount.” Some consider the global depression responsible for much of the drop; others blame tariffs. Many economists and analysts today say that history should serve as a warning against the measures being enacted by Trump.
The critics have relied too much on that historical comparison. In addition, political animus has driven liberal pundits to take (and promote) the darkest view imaginable about Trump’s program. So far, most have been wrong. For months they predicted that tariffs placed on imports would drive inflation higher; they haven’t. They predicted that the duties placed on imports would crush growth and lead to a recession. With consumer spending steadily advancing, according to credit card data, those dark days have yet to appear.
Democrats are positively hoping for disaster. Trump ran on a platform of wrestling down Joe Biden’s inflation; his adversaries are hoping he will fail, and they see tariffs as the likely agent of his failure. Bloomberg, MSNBC et the others have enthusiastically promoted the direst of predictions month after month, anticipating each new release of inflation data with the eagerness of kids waiting for Santa Claus. While glumly reporting month after month of weaker than expected inflation, the merchants of gloom inevitably add a “… yet.” They are positive that any minute now the tariff damage will blossom.
They may be right; tariffs will almost surely boost prices, but the impact should be modest (after all, imports are only about 11 percent of our economy). At some point the pontificators will have to reassess their assumptions about how businesses and consumers will adapt to the higher duties. Many companies are scrambling to change their sourcing to avoid tariffs, and Americans are navigating around the price increases where possible.
The end game for Trump is bringing more manufacturing to the U.S., beefing up industries essential to our security — like steel — and earning significant revenues as a valuable byproduct. How this all plays out is uncertain, but that Trump is committed to all three goals is not.
Liz Peek is a former partner of major bracket Wall Street firm Wertheim and Company.