Brazil Election to Test Latin America’s Conservative Wave

SÃO PAULO: Brazil heads to the polls Sunday in an election that could determine whether Latin America’s most populous country becomes the latest major nation in the region to turn toward the right, following conservative victories in Colombia, Peru, Chile and elsewhere. Voters will decide whether to remove left-wing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from office.

Lula, 80, is locked in a tight race with Brazilian Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro. The incumbent previously spent time in prison over corruption convictions linked to a massive bribery scandal.

Neither candidate is expected to secure an outright victory in Sunday’s first round. The latest Datafolha poll gives Lula 42% support and Bolsonaro 38%, within a two-point margin of error. In a potential runoff, Lula leads by just 3%. However, previous Brazilian elections have shown that polls can miss the final result.

“The problem with Datafolha, which is the largest polling institute in the country, is that it tends to underestimate the force and voting intention in candidates running against Lula or the Workers Party (PT). This has been consistent for at least over a decade, and it underestimated Jair Bolsonaro’s number on the runoff of 2018 by 7%,” Roberto Reis, an electoral strategist who works with candidates across multiple levels and analyzes polling aggregators, told News Media. “According to the latest aggregator data such as MRT News or Polling Data, we currently have Lula leading Bolsonaro 42% to 39% on the first runoff of the elections with Bolsonaro leading Lula 45% to 44% on the runoff,” he added.

For one Brazil analyst, the election represents more than another left-versus-right contest in Latin America. Brazil is the hemisphere’s largest remaining obstacle to a broader conservative shift. Although Cuba, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay also have left-wing governments, Brazil is by far the largest and most influential economy among them. The International Monetary Fund ranks it as the world’s 11th-largest economy, while the World Bank places it 10th.

Throughout the campaign, Bolsonaro has worked to build ties with President Donald Trump while portraying himself as a potential U.S. partner in the Western Hemisphere. The two met at the White House in May and discussed organized crime, tariffs and Brazil’s reserves of rare earths and critical minerals. Brazil has substantial supplies of these materials, which could help reduce U.S. and European reliance on Russia and China.

Bolsonaro also said he had asked Washington to designate Brazil’s two largest criminal organizations—the First Capital Command, or PCC, and the Red Command, known in Portuguese as Comando Vermelho—as terrorist groups. The State Department approved both designations on May 28, and they took effect in June under Section 219 of the Immigration and Naturalization Code.

The U.S. designations angered Lula and his allies, who described them as direct interference in Brazil’s domestic affairs. They also viewed the move as an endorsement by the Trump administration of Bolsonaro’s argument that Lula’s left-wing populist government has failed to do enough to confront organized crime.

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Flávio Bolsonaro has proposed a free-trade agreement between Brazil and the United States, with the possibility of expanding it into a wider trade framework for countries across the Americas. His campaign has also highlighted cooperation with Washington on critical minerals, an increasingly strategic issue as the Trump administration seeks to reduce U.S. dependence on China, according to a recent report by Brazil’s leading newspaper, Folha de S. Paulo.

Such policies would mark a clear shift from Lula’s current foreign-policy priorities.

China is Brazil’s largest trading partner, and Brazilian agricultural exports to the country exceeded $55 billion in 2025, according to Reuters. Lula has defended close relations with Beijing and pursued what he calls an independent foreign policy—one that has often taken an aggressive tone toward the United States and some of its closest allies, including Israel.

Relations between Lula and Trump have been significantly more strained. In July, Washington imposed new 25% tariffs on a broad range of Brazilian goods, affecting approximately $7 billion in exports. Lula’s government has challenged the tariffs and sought negotiations, so far with limited success. Washington has also barred most new permanent visa requests from Brazil, a policy that could affect future green-card applications.

A Bolsonaro administration would seek closer economic and security ties with the United States, stronger alignment with Israel, a more forceful response to China’s influence in Brazil and less friction within the hemisphere and on the global stage. Turning those promises into policy would depend on negotiations with Congress, Brazil’s powerful bureaucracy and the country’s economic priorities—particularly those of its influential agribusiness and mining sectors.

A Lula victory would preserve a foreign-policy approach centered on strong commercial ties with China and strategic autonomy from Washington, along with his government’s current position on Israel and Gaza. Both positions conflict directly with Trump’s policies and could further strain U.S.-Brazilian relations.

With the presidential contest increasingly likely to go to a second round, the election’s outcome could play a decisive role in shaping a new political order in the Americas—and determining the future of U.S. interests across the hemisphere.